Democracy is often described as a system in which a majority of electors choose one out of a number of competing parties to form a government and carry out its programme. Unfortunately, spontaneous majorities rarely form in support of one party. We generalize from a 'government' to a 'median' mandate, in which the median elector chooses the pivotal party in parliament, which then translates his or her preferences into public policy. To check this we investigate how accurately parliaments and governments represent the left-right position of the median voter in each of twenty parliamentary democracies. Distortions depend on the type of electoral arrangement, being relatively smaller under proportional representation than under single-member districts. Distortions do not equate to biased representation, however. Once we consider how distortions at one step or one time are compensated by distortions in the opposite direction at another, overall representation of the median voter position is reasonably accurate.
us away from incommensurable 'visions' of democracy, such as the majoritarian and consensus versions cited above. Instead, it replaces them with a unified standard by which democracy should and, as we show, broadly does operate. This is achieved by shifting the focus of the mandate from government to the pivotal median party in parliament. 3 If the parliamentary median is the choice of the median elector, the link is made between majority electoral preferences and what goes on in the legislature, where the median party has a controlling influence under the conditions specified below. That influence should show up in a close relationship between the parliamentary median party policy positions and the government policy positions.
Spelling out the argument for the policy-determining role of elections in more detail, we start with the fact that under certain conditions their aggregate results reveal the policy preferences of the median voter. Given that the median is that policy position crucial to the formation of a popular majority, it gives every voter the most they can hope for under the existing distribution of preferences as revealed by equal voting. The proper role of an election can be seen as the identification of this socially optimal position. To be truly democratic, the rules for aggregating votes into seats should empower the voter median by ensuring that it is also the policy position of the parliamentary median.
For the same reasons that make the median elector crucial to forming a popular majority, the parliamentary median is crucial to building a legislative majority. Bringing the two into correspondence means that the policies a popular majority would endorse if it were asked about them directly are the ones favoured by the median party and hence close to those eventually approved by parliament. This implies that processes of elite bargaining in the legislature, even if insulated from direct electoral pressures, will still reflect popular preferences -as they must do, of course, to be really democratic. The median mandate provides a concrete mechanism through which convergence of the two medians can take place, rather than relying on elite goodwill.
Our extension of mandate theory from a government to a median mandate enables us to ask what the concrete embodiments of democracy have in common, rather than turning to the relativism of different 'visions' employing different evaluative criteria for what democracy should be. That is, having a unified, mandate-based theory of democracy enables us to challenge assumptions of incommensurability. 4 We can evaluate different institutional arrangements by applying a common norm: how well do they specify and empower the median electoral preferences? Seen in this light, proportional representation emerges as superior to its main rival, labelled variously as the single-member district, Westminster or majoritarian system.
C O N C E P T U A L P R E L I M I N A R I E S
Mandate theory, like many other approaches in political science, is both normative and descriptive. Its normative and descriptive aspects are closely linked. As a normative theory, it provides a justification for representative democracy as being uniquely sensitive to citizen interests. As a descriptive theory, it gives an account of how democracy works in fact. We could hardly justify democracy as institutionalizing the mandate if we found that democracies in practice do not work that way. 5 Reflecting these two aspects of the theory, our discussion here first of all spells out the conditions necessary for the alternative versions of a democratic mandate to operate and then proceeds to see how far they exist in actual democratic practice. The most important indicator of whether the conditions apply is how well working democracies produce the correspondences between voters' expressed preferences and public policy that they are supposed to promote, a question we try to answer below with evidence from twenty democracies over the post-war period.
Before operationalizing or even stating the two sets of conditions that stand behind the variations of mandate theories, we need to clarify one important question: what is the underlying conception of democracy implicit in our previous comments and in what ensues? Following recent conceptual analyses, 6 we see democracy's defining characteristic as its creation of 'a necessary correspondence … between acts of governance and the equally weighted felt interests of citizens with respect to these acts.' 7 The key element in the definition is the necessary correspondence. It is included in Saward's definition to answer a stock criticism: would not a benevolent despot do as well for citizens' felt interests as a democracy? In terms of consensus democracy, the stock criticism could be translated into this query: would not autonomous and benevolent representatives serve citizens' interests as well as or better than majoritarian democracy? The answer, in either form of the question, holds that a simple correspondence of interests and policy is not enough. What distinguishes democracy is its institutional mechanism for creating the correspondence. This mechanism is the democratic election. The centrality of elections to democracy stems from the fact that they provide a recurring opportunity for citizens to express and empower their interests.
If the link between election results and governance breaks down, for example through lack of a clear majority party to form a government, the necessary correspondence between policy and preference is not created. To the extent this happens, democracy is attenuated. This is where the idea of a median correspondence comes in. Elections almost always identify a median electoral preference. Given its pivotal role in creating a majority, the median must be close to what the majority would endorse if voters were asked directly whether they would endorse a selected government over each possible alternative government. Having identified a median preference is no guarantee under representative democracy that it will become government policy, however, unless election rules ensure that the median party in the legislature is the one for which the median elector 5 As William Riker has written, political science research, 'starts with a goal and searches for a way to attain it … The scientific question is "What institutions encourage the chosen morality?" ' Empirical analyses enter because 'Description and analysis of causes (or more accurately, the analysis of occasions) are necessary for answering this question', Democracy in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. vi-vii. 6 Michael Saward, The Terms of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1998); cf. Albert Weale, Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1999 voted. The median parliamentarian party is crucial if legislative voting is majority-based, as it is pivotal to forming a majority. To the extent the medians correspond, the system is more democratic. To the extent the rules make this correspondence capricious and arbitrary, the system is less than democratic.
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Our normative criteria thus follow directly from the general standard for democracy spelled out above. In the next section we see how the different versions of mandate theory operationalize the creation of a 'necessary correspondence' between popular preferences and public policy, before going on to investigate how far the conditions of government and median mandates apply to contemporary practice.
E X T E N D I N G M A N D A T E T H E O R Y F R O M G O V E R N M E N T T O M E D I A N

Theoretical Conditions for a Government Mandate
Government mandate theory can be characterized as saying that the policy preferences of a knowable and coherent majority of voters determine the winner of an election and that 8 The 'power of the median' and its centrality to preferences have of course been put to use in many areas of rational choice theory. Duncan Black formulates the median voter theorem in his Figure 1 and the accompanying discussion below summarize their arguments why the median must dominate electoral or parliamentary decision making. To our knowledge, however, ours is the first formulation to put forward explicitly a mandate theory based on its power and centrality to preferences, though other analysts, such as G. Bingham Powell, have used median positions in the electorate as an indicator of majority preference and median positions in parliaments as one indicator of the type of public output that will emerge. Below we use them for the same purposes, though based on different measures. The real innovation is to recognize their theoretical power in the context of the mandate.
winner takes its turn at running government on the policy lines it had promised before the election. In its more detailed form, Table 1 summarizes the theory as comprehensively as  possible. Conditions 1 to 6 are explicitly spelled out by the various authorities listed in the table notes, with somewhat different emphases depending on whether their focus is on the parties' role in offering choices or the voters' role in making them. Condition 1, Party Distinctiveness, says that for a mandate to operate parties have to offer a policy choice; otherwise there is no policy-based reason to prefer one party above another.
9 Conditions 2 and 3, Voter Information and Motivation, say that voters must be informed enough to recognize party policy differences on offer and policy-motivated enough to base their choices on the policy profile closest to their preferred position; otherwise their votes are not communicating policy information. With votes cast on the basis of policies, the Voter Majority condition, Condition 4, requires that a majority preference for a particular party be clearly registered; otherwise one cannot know what the majority prefers. Condition 5, Electoral System Translation, says that adherence to all the preceding conditions would go for naught if the electoral system mistranslates the voter majority. Finally, Condition 6, Party Policy Commitment, says that the party in government translates its policy proclamations into policy; otherwise voters would elect whom they (thought that they) want but would not get what they want.
To check whether the conditions for a government mandate are actually met, we do not need to look into each and every one of the conditions. Each is necessary for a government mandate to operate. Thus, failure with respect to any one condition indicates that a mandate is not present in the case in question. Given the conditions of the theory, it makes sense to concentrate on electoral majority endorsement of governments as it forms one essential mechanism postulated by the theory for creating a correspondence between popular preferences and public policy. However, it is not at all obvious that a majority mandate does emerge in contemporary democracies. A first test for a real government mandate being conferred asks whether knowable and coherent electoral majorities are actually evident in practice.
Evidence for the Presence of a Government Mandate in Contemporary Democracies
To the weight of past evidence we can add our own results, from twenty democracies with 254 elections and 471 governments. Our data cover the first constitutionally authorized democratic election after 1949 to the formation of any government in 1995. Seats and votes to 1990 rely on data reported by Andrea Volkens and her colleagues, who themselves relied on compilations by Thomas Mackie and Richard Rose. 10 After 1990, vote and seat data come from various annual political updates reported in the European Journal of Political Research. Designations of governments, parties in government and durations of 9 Convergence ideas, as in Downs's Economic Theory, pp. 114-21, would suggest that parties that converged on the median electoral position and adopted it as their own would make the 'necessary connection' between electoral preferences and government policy. While that is true as a static theoretical formulation, convergence would also lead to the irrelevance and ultimate disappearance of parties that need to maintain their separate policy identities to survive (Economic Theory, pp. 105-13). 10 6.4%
governments come from the compilation by Jaap Waldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge.
11 Table 2 categorizes election results in five single-member district (SMD) systems. Support among the electorate and the status of the ensuing government(s) are combined into five possibilities.
1. An electoral majority produces a majority government.
2. An electoral plurality manufactures a majority government.
3. An electoral minority produces a majority government, where an electoral minority refers to a party receiving fewer votes than the plurality party. 4. An electoral plurality produces a minority government.
5. An electoral minority produces a minority government, where an electoral minority refers to a party receiving fewer votes than the plurality party.
Only 10.9 per cent of the SMD elections have electoral majorities producing majority governments. Because these governments last slightly longer than other types, the majority-majority status covers an average of 14 per cent of the time in government. The modal outcome under SMD rules is for a single party to win an electoral plurality and have majority control of government. This occurred for 64.5 per cent of the SMD elections and covers about 68 per cent of government time. This is the modal result in all five SMD countries. In another 10.0 per cent of SMD elections, we find an anomalous outcome where a party running second to the plurality party gains majority control of government. In 8.2 per cent of the SMD elections, a plurality party did not receive enough of the usual bonus to win a seat majority but did win enough seats to form a minority government. Finally, on seven occasions a party with an electoral minority held the largest number of parliamentary seats, formed a government, but fell short of majority control.
It is clear from these results that a necessary condition for a government mandate, the emergence of an identifiable majority-supported party, does not exist in these purportedly majoritarian, SMD-based, democracies. The plurality-supported governments that emerge do not meet the criteria for such a mandate, as there is no guarantee that they are not strongly opposed by the majority of electors who voted for other parties. Elections in these five democracies are thus often determining in the sense of deciding who wins but not majority-empowering, since no electoral majority exists for any single party or for a particular grouping of parties. The winning party can claim a mandate, but it is not known that it has been given a mandate.
How far do PR systems institutionalize the conditions for a government mandate? Table  3 shows, paradoxically, that they are far more likely than SMD systems to produce majority governments with groupings of parties that have garnered a majority of votes. This occurs in 53.7 per cent of the governments forming under PR systems, which is five times more frequently than in SMD systems (see Table 2 ). Given the duration of these governments, this condition amounts to majority-majority governance 55.4 per cent of the time. However, only ten of these cases are single-party majority governments.
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On the face of it, this extensive majority-majority correspondence under PR rules meets 11 Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge, Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945 48 Democracies ( -1998 28.8%
6.9%
the conditions for a government mandate. A fatal flaw exists however in the nature of the electoral majority manufactured in the process of putting together a majority coalition in the legislature; it is produced by bargaining between parties after the election so that no coherent popular majority exists for the government programme. The electoral majority the government rests on is top-down, not bottom-up, and thus is not one created by the voters' expressed preferences. While perfectly good as a theory in itself, and omnipresent as a justification for democracy the government mandate seems irrelevant to the practical workings of contemporary democracies. Its emphasis on empowering the majority is not met since a knowable and coherent electoral majority so seldom in fact creates a government.
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That does not imply that we ought to totally abandon the idea of a mandate from electorate to government. It is difficult to see any other mechanism whereby elections can translate popular preferences into policy under representative democracy. A temptation is to turn to direct democracy as the only way in which policy could be democratically determined.
14 There is, however, the alternative already suggested. We want to alter the focus of mandate theory from selecting winners to empowering the median party in parliament, and in so doing set up more realistic conditions for a mandate's conferment.
Theoretical Conditions for a Median Mandate
Suspend the idea that elections are about who governs and mass democratic governance looks very different. Instead of asking who governs, ask: from what policy position does governance emanate? The answer is simple when parties give a broadly unidimensional form to the policy space and are motivated by the policy preferences that give rise to their alignment. The policy position in control is that of the party of the median parliamentarian. This is what Peter van Roozendahl has identified as the 'central' party.
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To see why, consider Figure 1 , where actors prefer any policy closer to their own preference on a left-right continuum. This puts C, at the median, in the most powerful position. Actors both to left and right need C to form a majority. C can thus bargain for 13 It could be argued that the situation is better than this because electoral alliances of parties often provide two alternatives to the electorate, one of which gets a majority (e.g., left and right in France). It is only rarely, however, that these agree on a common programme before the election. As they generally do not, electors still do not know what policy package they are voting for, so the conditions for a government mandate are still not being met.
14 Ian Budge, The New Challenge of Direct Democracy (London: Polity, 1996). 15 Van Roozendahl, 'Centre Parties and Coalition Formation'; and 'The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties'. a public policy close to its own position, by threatening to join the alternative majority if C does not get its way. Compared to policy positions of its rivals on one wing, C's position will be preferred by partners on the other wing in whatever coalition it joins. Thus C's position will constitute the point towards which majority-backed policy always tends.
It is important to recognize that this standard 'power of the median' argument applies both to electors and to policy-motivated parties. 16 It is the reason why the median position is so often used as an indicator of majority preferences. 17 Without the median voter, a knowable and coherent majority simply cannot be formed, by definition. Because the median position is so crucial, actors located there can bargain, implicitly or explicitly, to have the majority-supported position close to their own. Their trump is the credible threat to form an alternative majority with the people on the other wing. Thus majority preferences (under the conditions specified) must be at or near the median position.
The same logic must apply to parties if their internal discipline is tight enough for them to be regarded as unitary actors. Even if C is very small compared to the other parties these still need C's support to form a majority. Just as in the electorate, party C can bring the final policy close by threatening defection to an opposing wing. Under majority voting rules in a legislature, C is the policy king.
We spell out the details of the necessary conditions for a median mandate in Table 4 . They closely resemble those for the government mandate in Table 1 . This is not surprising, as the electoral majority on which a government mandate rests is a special case of the median mandate; where there is a single-party majority, the median position is by definition part of it. The reverse does not hold however; there can be a median position without the majority voting for a single party.
Under any mandate theory, parties have to present a choice to electors; otherwise there is no policy-based reason for voters to prefer one party over another. Thus once again we have Condition 1, Party Distinctiveness. Conditions 2 and 3, Voter Information and Motivation, like Conditions 2 and 3 for the government mandate, say that voters must be informed enough to recognize party policy differences on offer and policy motivated enough to base their choices on the policy profile closest to their preferred position; otherwise their votes are not communicating policy information. Condition 4, a Shared Policy Space, requires that voters and parties communicate in largely the same political language, probably a left-right dimension; otherwise what the voters think they have expressed and what the parties think that they have heard will not connect. Condition 5, Electoral System Translation, says that the election outcome, in terms of the distribution of seats among parties in parliament, makes the party of the median parliamentarian the same as the party preferred by the median voter. Condition 6, Party Policy Commitment, says that there must exist a self-motivation among parliamentarians to see their policy preferences converted into actual policy; otherwise they would not empower the parliamentary median for policy purposes. A robust comparative finding on coalition 16 2. Vote Information -voters recognize the policy profiles of the parties.
3. Voter Motivation -voters cast their ballots on the basis of the party policy position they prefer to see in control of policy making.
4. Shared Party-Voter Alignment -voters and parties arrange their public policy preferences within broadly the same policy space, probably a left-right dimension.
5. Electoral System Translation -the election outcome makes the party supported by the median voter the party with which the median parliamentarian affiliates.
6. Party Policy Commitment -parties are motivated by a desire to see their own policy position control policy making.
7. Power of the Median -the occupant of the median position is crucial to the creation of a majority in both the electorate and parliament.
(a) Majority-endorsed preferences tend towards the median voter position, so this forms the best indicator of popular policy preferences in general.
(b) Public policy tends towards the policy of the parliamentary median under legislative majority voting procedures.
governments is that over 80 per cent incorporate the legislative median party. 18 Where they do not, this is often under minority governments where the median can exercise control over legislative coalitions anyway. 19 Finally, Condition 7 summarizes standard Power of the Median reasoning previously discussed, so does not require a detailed justification here. We can refer again to Figure 1 which demonstrates that, logically, actors with preferences located along such a continuum who prefer nearer policy outcomes to ones further away will ally with the median actor, who can therefore swing the policy in its direction by the threat of changing allegiance to the other wing.
It perhaps bears repeating that the Power of the Median result applies both to electors and legislative parties. However, it has a somewhat different standing at the two levels. In the case of electors it justifies using the median position to estimate what the majority preference is, as we show immediately below.
Talking to Each Other in Policy Space
Under median mandate conditions a Shared Policy Space becomes crucial for recognizing that a mandate has been assigned. It is what allows us to identify a median without requiring a country's political space to be unidimensional in some fundamental and absolute sense, and by relaxing the assumption renders the conditions for such a mandate widely applicable. But, we must ask, are we not running into problems of cyclical voting and policy incoherence by not imposing unidimensionality as a necessary condition? To evaluate fully the condition of a shared policy space, we need to start with the basic structure of the policy space and move on to link it to shared communication in general and medians in particular. An important starting point is to note that the dimensionality of policy space depends less on the number of issues or policies involved than on the number of parties. While the policy space over k issues approaches something on the order of being k-dimensional, parties structure the k-dimensional space into a much smaller order of dimensionality by virtue of their limited numbers. That makes the conversation between voters and potential governors highly structured, where the structure comes principally from the parties on offer at election time. At the lower extreme of a two-party system, unidimensionality is true by definition. Three parties might require two dimensions, four parties three dimensions, and so on; so that the hypothetically conceivable upper bound of the dimensionality of the policy space of an election as structured by P parties is P Ϫ 1. At this upper extreme, with a space of P Ϫ 1, each party is an entity unto itself, offering a programme incommensurable with the programme of every other party. This might be a description of a system organized by exclusively single-issue parties. One party takes a position on abortion and nothing else, another party takes a position on agricultural subsidies and nothing else, another takes up wetland preservation and nothing else, and so on. However, this is not a party system known to anyone. Rather, most parties take positions on a range of issues, and most observers, experts and citizens in the mass public alike, can characterize them along something like a single left-right dimension.
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These considerations help explain our relaxed tone on unidimensionality. In practice, the basic ordering of preferences is likely to be characterized reasonably well as spread along the well-known left-right continuum. Apart from expert and party use of it as a preferred frame of reference the most telling evidence comes from the review of mass survey research on collective representation carried through by Philip Converse and Roy Pierce and more recently by Pierce, Warren Miller and their collaborators. 22 Their analyses show that voters do have a strong sense of where they themselves and the parties stand on the broad contours of policy as indicated by the left-right dimension. Pierce summarizes the findings by saying:
The issue to which they [voters] super-issue … : the left-right dimension on the European continent or the liberal-conservative dimension in the United States. Voter-party congruence on more specific issues, even those that are traditionally linked to the ideological dimension, is much more limited.
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By simply casting a vote for the nearest party on this dimension, communicated to them by parties and the media, a voter can register her or his preference for a policy programme on shared criteria. The overall distribution of percentages based on everyone voting for their preferred party then designates the median voter position and the party closest to it.
T H E M E D I A N M A N D A T E : D O E S I T A C T U A L L Y O P E R A T E ?
The median mandate rests on a more subtle and extended argument than the government mandate. Nevertheless, a first check on whether its conditions apply in practice can be made by investigating the correspondence between electoral, parliamentary and government policy preferences. If the correspondence exists, it does not prove the institutionalization of the correspondence so vital to the idea of the mandate. However, we can then look at further evidence, such as variation in the extent of correspondence between different electoral systems, PR being expected to match up to the conditions better given its explicit purpose of matching the voter strength of parties with seat strength in parliament. The absence of any actual correspondence would, by contrast, negate the idea of necessary correspondence entirely and conclusively demonstrate the absence of conditions for a median mandate.
Data
Our data cover the same 254 elections giving rise to 471 governments in the twenty countries that we used to look into the government mandate thesis. To investigate median correspondence, the most obvious approach, given the discussion above, is to identify the positions of parties and voters along a left-right dimension. To do this we start with left-right party scoring from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), using the CMP98 release. 25 We apply the operational strategies described below, but first provide the overview in Table 5 . The left portion of the table reports the number of governments, government sequence numbers, the caretaker and non-partisan governments, and the number of elections. 26 The 24 This makes the act of voting a simple act; one votes a sincere preference. Parties, motivated as they are assumed to be by their own policy preferences, will see to it that the position of the median party controls policy. This reasoning supplies a simpler explanation for Downs's conjecture that voters in multi-party systems are driven to treat voting as an expressive act compared to Downs's own argument that voters' rational abilities are overwhelmed by PR systems with multiple parties (Downs, Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 142-63). Indeed, ironically, it implies that the rational abilities of voters in SMD electoral systems are taxed relatively more. One might expect to see more strategic ballots cast in multi-party SMD elections where there is a strong likelihood that the electoral system will manufacture a majority (median) party in parliament, providing an incentive for some voters to take into account how the electoral system translation might affect the designation of the median (majority) party in parliament. 25 Our preliminary observations of the left-right positions of Icelandic and Portuguese parties revealed that parties in these two countries were making large jumps to the right in one election only to move just as far to the left in the next election. More detailed analyses revealed that nearly all of these movements were the result of Icelandic and Portuguese parties sometimes placing a great deal of emphasis on their claim to holding legitimate Political Authority, one of the thirteen CMP categories indicative of being on the political right. 28 We concluded that claims to political authority in these two countries are not to be taken as an indicator of a right-leaning political emphasis. Therefore, the left-right scores of Icelandic and Portuguese parties are calculated using twenty-five policy categories, excluding 'political authority', from the sum of the 'right' emphases.
The left-right placements of parties by the CMP have been shown to be a reliable and valid measure when evaluated against expert and mass perceptions of party left-right positions. 29 An especially important benefit of the CMP data is that they record changes in party positions from one election to the next. Expert and mass survey data on party positions, however, have been collected on only a few occasions. Moreover, it appears that expert perceptions of party position across a decade, comparing the Castles-Mair data with the Huber-Inglehart data, 30 are so stable as to eliminate any possibility of taking account of party movements.
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Median voter. The position of the median voter is calculated as a variation on the measurement strategy devised by HeeMin Kim and Richard Fording using the CMP data. 32 We have made two adjustments to their original operationalization. First, we modified the left-right positions of Icelandic and Portuguese parties as described above. Secondly, when the farthest left or farthest right party in a system is involved in the formula, we require that the voter distribution around that party take a form that we find more plausible than 27 that implied by the Kim and Fording calculation. The measure produces eminently reasonable country placements, column 4 of Table 5 , which show, for example, Australia, consistent with its post-war political history, as the most right-leaning country, Germany as centrist, and Norway most to the left.
Parliamentary median. We identify a parliamentary median by the position of the weighted median party. That is, a parliamentary median is at the left-right position of the party with which the middle parliamentarian affiliates, given the left-right alignment of parties according to their CMP scores. The results of ten elections placed the member between two parties. In these cases we have scored the median as the midpoint between those parties.
Government policy position.
We calculate the left-right position of a government as the weighted mean position of the parties in government, where the weights are the parliamentary seat percentages among parties in government. 33 Using parliamentary seats as the weights is justified by repeated findings that government ministries are usually allocated to government parties in proportion to the seats they hold in parliament among the parties in government. 34 Using a weighted average to indicate a government's left-right position is based on the assumption that parties in government influence policy in proportion to the cabinet posts they occupy. When there is just one party in government, that party's left-right position is the government's position; the party holds 100 per cent of the weight of the parties in government. When there are two parties in government, one with seventy-five seats and the other with twenty-five seats, then the position of the party with seventy-five seats has three times as much weight in the calculation of the government's position as the party with twenty-five seats.
In order to provide a modest reliability and validity check, we have compared our government policy scores with others calculated in the same way but using expert scores. For thirty-two governments of the early 1980s and early 1990s for which we have parallel scores, r ϭ 0.82.
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Findings
The first check on whether the conditions for a median mandate exist is to examine the two principal linkages in empowering the median voter. The first involves the step from elections to parliaments; the second involves the step from parliaments to governments. Finding persistent policy correspondences in either case does not conclusively demonstrate a necessary correspondence as required by the median mandate, but it is certainly evidence in its favour. Institutional mechanisms for achieving correspondence come in when we compare policy correspondence under SMD and PR. SMD systems are not especially adept at translating votes to seats accurately, and they are further encumbered when matching median voters to median parliamentarians because their party systems tend to have small numbers of parties that leave gaps in the left-right space between parties on offer. PR 33 systems, by contrast, are designed to reflect accurately vote proportions in the distribution of parliamentary seats, and with their comparatively large number of parties they should be able to bring electoral and parliamentary medians into alignment better than SMD systems. Contrariwise, in the next step, from parliament to government, SMD systems are well designed to empower in government the party that the preceding election, accurately or not, empowered in parliament. PR systems leave it to party negotiation to work out the government, leaving some to wonder whether the result comes from a legislative game, not much tied to elections. 36 Across the two stages, therefore, policy correspondence between parliament and voters ought to be greater under PR, and policy correspondence between government and parliament ought to be greater under SMD. Table 6 shows nation-by-nation distortion, bias and responsiveness in the step from voters to parliaments. Our measure of distortion is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the parliamentary median left-right position and the left-right position of the median voter at the preceding election (elections are the units of analysis, N ϭ 254). Distortion addresses an important element in analyses of electorate-government correspondence, but it is only part of what is at issue. Among other things, it stacks the deck against a finding of correspondence in SMD systems compared to PR systems. One of the main arguments often advanced in favour of SMD is its ability to produce clear-cut alternation. Major parties of both left and right may be incongruent with electors' preferences at the time of any one election. However, over a series of elections the policy incongruities may cancel each other out, leaving the mean over-time policy position of parliament close to that of the electorate. Therefore, to the analysis of congruence we add an analysis of bias, measured as the average difference between the position of the parliamentary median and the median voter left-right position. By going beyond the absolute value calculation of distortion, this analysis treats parliamentary representation as more than a one-off phenomenon in a single election, independent of what happens at other elections. It is not that this is important and distortion is not. Both are important, so we present analyses of both.
The left-most column reports our distortion results for parliaments in relation to voters. The five SMD nations show relatively large distortions. Their scores on average are 12.5 and exceed 10 in four out of five nations, Canada being the exception. In contrast, the average voter-parliament distortion across PR systems is 4.4 and never exceeds 10. These findings are in line with expectations. 37 If policy congruence were not improved under PR compared to SMD, we would begin to doubt whether the median mandate actually worked in practice. But, as we have said, congruence is only a part of what is at issue.
In the second column of Table 6 we report the average bias for each of the twenty nations, along with summaries by electoral system type. With these results, the case for the median mandate comes more clearly into focus. The average representational bias under SMD systems shows that distortions in single elections are compensated over time, leading to an average bias of only 4.7, in contrast to an average distortion of 12.5. This is an across-time compensation for distortion that amounts to a 7.8 unit reduction, which means proportionately that government alternation in SMD systems reduces distortion by 62 per cent (1 Ϫ [7.8/12.5] ϭ 0.62). Across-time compensation operates under PR, as well. The average representational bias among PR systems is only 0. reduction, which proportionately equates to alternations reducing distortions in PR systems by 98 per cent (1 Ϫ [0.1/4.4] ϭ 0.98). Overall, and over the long run, both SMD and PR systems do a respectable job at translating the left-right position of the median voter into something similar in parliaments.
These conclusions would go for nil, or very nearly so as far as the median mandate thesis is concerned, if the close average correspondences were not much tied to elections. One might imagine that a good deal of the congruence is a matter of parties and voters in the same country sharing a somewhat similar policy space, even if the two are not co-ordinated with one another by elections. 38 This would mean that the correspondence is present but, contrary to Saward's requirement, that elections would not be creating the correspondence. Analyses of responsiveness tell us about this possibility explicitly, for responsiveness is the degree to which movement in the median elector position is matched by similar movement in the parliamentary policy position.
39 Therefore, the evidence consistent with the median mandate is much strengthened by our findings on responsiveness, appearing on the right-hand side of Table 6 .
The responsiveness evidence is a set of bivariate regressions relating the left-right positions of parliamentary medians to left-right positions of median voters, by country and electoral system types. Coefficients for this relationship are significant in all countries except France. What is even more noteworthy, however, is that for no country can we reject the hypothesis that the responsiveness, in the long run through time, is one-to-one. A unit movement, left or right, by a median voter tends to lead to a unit movement by the parliamentary median. Among SMD nations the one-to-one responsiveness inference is made possible partially due to the fact that the responsiveness is not especially reliable (i.e., the standard errors of estimate and therefore the standard errors of the responsiveness coefficients are relatively large), but in most countries, SMD systems included, the coefficient itself is not far from 1.0. Generalizing across systems by estimating the responsive equations for all SMD and all PR systems in just two separate equations, we see (1) responsiveness is close to one-to-one regardless of system type, (2) a rightward bias exists in SMD systems while there is virtually no bias among PR systems, and (3) the correspondence is noticeably more reliable under PR. 40 38 Alternatively, one might also imagine that congruence is an artefact of survey-based measures of citizen ideological positions. For example, as we describe in an Appendix (see website version of this article), survey-based measures of citizen left-right positions appear to contain little valid cross-national variation. According to survey-based evidence, median voters in Norway, Sweden, Australia and the United States, among others, appear to be located at or very near to the centre of the survey scale, as if respondents are norming their self-placements in left-right space to the centre in their own country regardless of how their national left-right space compares to that in other countries. This lack of meaningful cross-national variation in survey-based median voter measurements leaves one wondering whether, for example, Powell's findings in Elections as Instruments of Democracy (see also, Huber and Powell, 'Congruence between Citizens and Governments'; Powell and Vanberg, 'Election Laws, Disproportionality and Median Correspondence') are principally a matter of governments in PR systems tending towards the middle without there being any electoral co-ordination. 39 We conducted the same analyses using two alternative methods of scoring party positions, which in turn affects the scoring of median voter and government positions. First, we scored all parties as having a left-right position equal to its mean value over the entire post-war period. Secondly, we scored their positions with a three-election moving average, a sort of compromise between allowing party positions to change with each election and assuming, implicitly via the mean scoring, that party positions are constant. The results are similar under the three measurement strategies and therefore are not an artefact of this aspect of our measurements. 40 Of course, combining nations relies on cross-national variation for estimates of responsiveness. That variance is only sometimes relevant to theoretically driven questions about representation. However, as can be seen from the country-specific analyses, the summaries provide reasonably accurate statements about countries within each system grouping, so little is lost by our reliance on convenient summaries. Table 7 reports the distortion, bias and responsiveness in the relationship between the weighted average left-right positions of governments and left-right positions of parliamentary medians. The units of analysis here are governments, rather than elections as in Table 6 . At issue here is whether democratic systems have the follow-through required by the median mandate thesis. We have just seen that median voter positions are rather faithfully represented in parliaments, even in SMD systems, once we look across a number of elections. This could itself count for very little, however, if the parliamentary median is not the position from which governance emanates. One way of checking on this is to see whether left-right positions of governments line up with their parliaments. We cannot consider this a necessary relationship under the thesis. As Kaare Strøm has observed, 'government participation is not a necessary condition for policy payoff.' 41 The power of the median may well be present on policy matters when the median position does not mark the position of the government. The party at the parliamentary median may share government ministries with parties to its left or right without ceding policy control. Still, if governments do line up with parliaments along a left-right dimension, the matching alignments would have to be considered evidence in favour of the thesis. Indeed, one reason why mandate theses have been applied most frequently to SMD-based systems is because those are the situations where a government-parliamentary alignment is nearly guaranteed by the majority status of one major party, which also means it is at the parliamentary median.
The left-hand portion of Table 7 confirms what we know about SMD and PR systems. In SMD systems, distortions and biases in the step from parliament to government are somewhere between small and non-existent, and in PR systems parliament-to-government distortions are larger. Parliament-to-government distortion in SMD systems never exceeds 4.7, while ten of the fifteen PR systems show distortions greater then 5.0. When we take account of over-time compensations through alternations, however, we see that nearly all the parliament-to-government distortion in SMD systems goes away and so too does most of it under PR. The maximum value of bias is ϩ 4.1 in Finland, and twelve of the fifteen PR systems have bias magnitudes at or below Ϯ 3.0. In all twenty countries, governments and parliaments are rather well aligned with one another, through time.
Do the movements of government left-right positions correspond to those of the parliamentary median? Yes, in every country except Denmark responsiveness of left-right positions of governments to movements of the left-right positions of parliamentary medians is statistically significant. Nowhere is there a biased translation (all intercepts are statistically indistinguishable from zero). Moreover, usually the responsiveness coefficient is close to 1.0. We do see, however, that aside from the absence of responsiveness in Denmark, in Australia, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland responsiveness coefficients are slightly more than two standard errors below the one-to-one ideal. In Denmark the low responsiveness is attributable to all colourations of governments being selected almost regardless of the ideological distribution in its parliament. In Australia the relatively low responsiveness is entirely attributable to a month-long transition Liberal government taking office despite its minority parliamentary status just before the December 1975 election. In the three other countries, the relatively low responsiveness arises from the formation of coalitions reaching across from left to right -the frequent grand coalitions of SPÖ and Ö VP in Austria, the frequent coalitions of Fine Gael plus Labour in Ireland, Dutch Christians plus PvdA during the early part of the period when they were centre-right and plus VVD during the later part of the period when they were centre-left, and the so-called 'magic formula' that almost always gives rise to all four major parties being involved in Swiss governments. These coalition governments tend to be located at positions slightly more centrist than their respective parliamentary medians. Considered across the two stages we have analysed, the responsiveness findings are remarkable. This is most especially due to the near one-to-one correspondence we see at both stages in almost all countries. 42 So far as we know, no one has supposed that the representational process operated in such an orderly and accurate manner. One tends to receive the impression from the distortions created by electoral translations in SMD systems and by government formation negotiations under PR that there are arbitrary and capricious forces at work in what should be a systematized process of policy representation. Our evidence, to the contrary, says that there is not only a systematic relationship in both steps but that the responsiveness is something close to one-to-one. The systematic relationship is not reliable in the short run, in the sense that at any one election the median in parliament might miss the mark set by the median voter by quite some distance or the government formed might miss the mark set by the parliamentary median. Still, in the long run the position of parliament tends to find the mark attributable to voters, and likewise the position of government tends to find the parliamentary mark.
Considered overall, therefore, elections and government formation appear to be operating in ways consistent with the median mandate thesis in both types of electoral systems. Of the two, PR is generally more congruent, less biased and more reliably responsive than SMD systems. This becomes even more clearly evident if we were to look at the long step from voters to governments (not shown). Despite the near one-to-one correspondences from voter to parliament and from parliament to government, the distortions and unreliability in the electoral translations of SMD systems weigh more heavily in getting in the way of carrying through the median mandate than do the distortions and unreliability when going from parliament to government under PR. Why is this? The most plausible explanation adds weight to the hypothesis of a median mandate at work.
SMD systems come up short on the two critical features, sparse party offerings and higher distortions of vote-to-seat translations. We know from a long train of evidence that SMD systems generally, and almost uniformly, have fewer parties than PR systems. 43 Also, parties in SMD systems tend to stick to their characteristically different policy position rather than converge towards a single position near the median voter, Canada being a partial exception. In total, then, SMD systems encourage a relatively small number of offerings, two of which have electoral plurality and majority government potential, and neither of them is generally close to the median voter. Once in a while SMD systems also grossly distort the vote-to-seat translation. The electorate may identify one party as the plurality party, but a different party may actually end up with a majority of the seats. Finally, an SMD electorate may move to the left and abandon a centre-left party for a more left-leaning small one, the effect of which is to have the electorate moving left while the centre-right party derives the real benefit of becoming the majority party in parliament and hence the driver of policy. PR systems, by contrast, are more likely than SMD systems to line up median voters with parliamentary medians and to put the party of the median parliamentarian in government, which they do in approximately 80 per cent of the cases.
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There is an important caveat to all that we are saying. To see the median mandate at work one has to look across some span of time. For any one government, representation of the median voter by a parliamentary median, the ideological inclination of parties in government in relation to parties in parliament, or both, are often distorted. During the time of any single government the magnitude of bias equals the magnitude of distortions, so the representation is not only distorted in the short run, but it is biased to the same extent. Thus, on close, short-run inspection the representational process will often appear to be out of alignment, because it often is out of alignment over the short run. It is across a series of elections and governments that the force of the median mandate thesis comes through clearly.
A P P L Y I N G A M E D I A N M A N D A T E A P P R O A C H T O E L E C T I O N S
Given the strong evidence for a median mandate actually functioning in contemporary democracies, what are the theoretical conclusions we can draw? Mainly, that we should stop thinking of elections as a clumsy and ineffective way of recording the majority choice of who should occupy government and reconceptualize them as recording the majority choice of policy. The precise mechanism through which this is done is by identifying the median voter preference and ensuring that this is also the policy position of the central (median) party in parliament.
It is important to note that the median mandate interpretation is a generalization and updating of the traditional mandate, which has given the winning party its legitimacy in Western democracies. In traditional mandate theory a winning party gains office because a majority approves its programme, which it then must carry through in government. Unfortunately, such an electoral majority is seldom seen in practice, contributing to the idea that elections are a broken mechanism so far as controlling government goes. In fact, mandate theory has often been pressed into service to justify 'elective dictatorships' based on pluralities that sometimes seem to be opposed by a popular majority.
What our reconceptualization of elections does is to transfer the idea of the mandate from the governing party(ies) as such to the median party in parliament, provided its position corresponds closely to that of the median voter. A popular majority can be said to have endorsed that position and given a mandate to the party, which its centrality in legislative coalition building ensures it can carry out. If everything works out properly this is what should happen. The workings of elections and governments in twenty democracies over the post-war period indicate that in broad terms it does happen, despite procedural imperfections. A major finding is that PR is better at specifying and bringing together median voter and party positions than single-member plurality districts. Under the idea that elections were about winning, PR has seemed an inefficient anomaly, particularly in the Anglo-American world, since it matches votes and seats in ways which rarely allow a clear majority winner to emerge. A consistent voice protesting this notion has been Arend Lijphart whose frequently heretical thesis has been that the resulting multi-party systems are better for negotiation and compromise -and ultimately popular satisfaction -than competitive two-party or three-party systems. 45 The weakness of 'consensus democracy', however, has been the absence of any clear and necessary connection between electors' preferences and elite responses. One can well believe that a benevolent elite in certain countries can arrive at optimal political solutions. But the process is hardly democratic when divorced from the actual results of elections. What we propose is precisely a reinterpretation that makes the electoral connection necessary, through the strategic role of the central party in representing the preferences of the median voter in elite negotiations. In so doing, it contributes to synthesizing 'two visions' of democracy that have often been taken as antithetical and incommensurable, 46 and hopefully also to the rehabilitation of elections as a practical policy device in which every vote counts for defining the median.
A P P E N D I X Our measurement of a median voter's position relies on the procedure developed by HeeMin Kim and Richard Fording, with two adjustments discussed below. 47 It differs from a survey-based measure in three respects. First, surveys asking respondents to locate themselves on a left-right scale often do not permit the identification of the party for whom a respondent had voted in an earlier national election. That requires the survey-based measure to refer to a median citizen rather than a median voter. 48 Secondly, and more importantly, surveys that ask a left-right self-placement question are infrequently available and hence are not applicable to time-series analyses. Thirdly, and most importantly, even if surveys did distinguish a median citizen from a median voter and even if they were more frequently available, they would not be up to the task of providing a good match to the party-position data. The party-position data are designed to have meaningful cross-national variation -i.e., if Norwegian parties locate themselves on average to the left of Australian parties of the same family (e.g., social democrats and conservatives), this can be taken as indicating that the Norwegian left-right space is left of the left-right space in Australia. This feature holds for the CMP data as well as for the 'expert' survey data. 49 Mass survey data on respondents' left-right positions, on the contrary, appear to have no such cross-national variation.
In nearly all countries the median voter positions identified by mass surveys are quite similar. 50 For example, the median citizen in Norway is recorded by surveys to be at the same left-right position as the median citizen in Australia, and even as the median citizen in the United States.
51 This is implausible when one thinks of the general differences between these countries' politics, Norway by almost any account being well to the left of Australia or the United States. One consequence is that, but for three countries that stand three to four standard deviations to the left of all the others (namely, France, Italy and Spain), the cross-national correlation between median citizen positions identified by surveys in the 1980s with those in the 1990s is almost non-existent and, worse, negative -i.e., r ϭ Ϫ 0.14. It appears, therefore, that voters in surveys report they are on the left, in the centre or on the right within the context of their own country's political space, rendering their self-placements suspect for any comparative analysis and, more damning for present purposes, for matching to the party-position data that do contain valid cross-national differences along the left-right dimension. The Kim-Fording measure uses leverage gained from the party system cross-national difference and has been validated in part by tests that pay attention to national political differences. 52 And, we can note, the overtime r ϭ ϩ 0.44 for the Kim-Fording measure applied to the same elections in the same fifteen nations for which Powell's survey data correlation is Ϫ 0.14.
The formula used by Kim and Fording is
Here: The one adjustment we made to their measurement strategy involved situations when the farthest left or farthest right party in a system is involved in the formulation of either L or W. In those cases, Kim and Fording allow the extreme score of Ϫ 100 or ϩ 100 to mark the endpoint where voters of that party are located. We find this implausible and its effect on the calculation undesirable. In particular, the Ϫ 100 and ϩ 100 endpoints can artificially stretch the distribution of voters around a party's position. Rather than assume the party's voters are so widely dispersed, we assume they are distributed in a symmetrical interval around the party's position. For example, for a leftmost party at Ϫ 15 and a 0 midpoint between it and an adjacent party on the right, we assume the left boundary of that party's voters is Ϫ 30. With this marginal modification, the measure produces cross-national characterizations of considerable plausibility (see the national median voter positions in Table 5 above) as well as passing several reliability checks such as the correlations between the country placements over time, all of which add to the extensive series of checks reported by Kim and Fording themselves. The great strength of the median measure, as with the Manifesto data themselves, is its ability to catch cross-national differences and over-time movements. This enables us to inspect structural, long-term features such as representativeness and responsiveness (Table 6 ), crucial to the assessment of whether mandates are operating. Static expert judgements and infrequent survey data on citizen self-placements have not allowed any of our predecessors to extend their investigations this far, thereby leading for example to harsh assessments of the extent to which majoritarian (SMD) systems co-ordinate popular preferences with public policy positions of parliaments and governments, which on our extended investigation are not altogether justified. 49 
